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By Pol Antràs∗
In recent years, we have witnessed a remarkable increase in the way ﬁrms organize production
on a global scale. A variety of terms have been used to refer to this phenomenon: the “slicing of
the value chain,” “international outsourcing,” “fragmentation of the production process,” “vertical
specialization,” “global production sharing,” and many more.
In developing their global sourcing strategies, ﬁrms not only decide on where to locate the
diﬀerent stages of the value chain, but also on the extent of control they want to exert over these
processes. The latter is the classical “make-or-buy” decision in industrial organization. Some
ﬁrms, such as Intel Corporation, decide to keep the production of intermediate inputs within
ﬁrm boundaries, thus engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) and intraﬁrm trade when the
integrated supplier is in a foreign country. Other ﬁrms, such as Nike, choose to contract with
arm’s-length suppliers for the procurement of these inputs, and thus their activities are in general
not recorded in FDI or intraﬁrm trade statistics.
The issue of internalization or control is crucial for gaining an understanding of multinational
ﬁrms.1 Yet, most previous theories of the multinational ﬁrm draw their boundaries appealing to
technological considerations, such as economies of scale or transport costs.2 In the three chapters
of my 2003 M.I.T. Ph.D. thesis, I instead set forth a purely organizational, property-rights model
of the multinational ﬁrm.3
I build on the work of Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), who put forth the idea
that ownership of physical assets is a source of power when contracts are incomplete. In particular,
in situations in which parties encounter contingencies that were not foreseen in an initial contract,
the agent enjoying property rights over the physical assets involved in production has the right to
decide on the use of these assets. The asset owner thus enjoys residual rights of control, or residual
powers, and this has a critical eﬀect on how the surplus ends up being divided between the parties.
Grossman and Hart show that in the presence of relationship-speciﬁc investments, these consid-
erations lead to a well-deﬁned theory of the boundaries of the ﬁrm in which both the beneﬁts and
the costs of integration are endogenous. By aﬀecting the ex-post division of surplus, the allocation
1of residual rights has a critical eﬀect on each party’s ex-ante incentives to invest, which in turn
determine the size of the surplus to be divided. A salient result of their analysis, and one that
will be exploited below, is that ex-ante eﬃciency dictates that residual rights of control should be
assigned to the party whose investment contributes most to the value of the relationship.
This paper attempts to provide an overview of how one can combine the insights from the
property-rights approach with the apparatus of international trade theory to study the location
and control decisions of the multinational ﬁrm in a uniﬁed framework.
I. A Simple Model of Firm Behavior
Let us consider ﬁrst a simple partial-equilibrium model in which a ﬁnal-good producer decides how
to organize production of a particular good taking as given the behavior of other producers.
Consumer preferences are such that the unique producer of good y faces demand given by
y = λp−1/(1−α), 0 <α<1,( 1 )
where p is the price of the good and λ is a parameter that the producer takes as given.
Production of good y requires the development of two specialized intermediate inputs h and m.
Output is a Cobb-Douglas function of these inputs
y =
µ
h
η
¶η µ
m
1 − η
¶1−η
, 0 <η<1,( 2 )
where a higher η is associated with a more intensive use of h in production.
There are two agents engaged in production: a ﬁnal-good producer (denoted by H) who supplies
the input h and produces the ﬁnal good y, and an operator of a manufacturing plant (denoted by
M) who supplies the input m.A g e n tH can produce h at a constant marginal cost ch, while agent
M can produce m at a constant marginal cost cm. In addition, production requires a ﬁxed cost
equal to f · g (ch,c m), where the function g is nondecreasing in its arguments. Both inputs are
tailored speciﬁcally to the needs of the other party in the transaction and, for simplicity, they are
assumed to be useless outside this particular relationship.
Ic o n s i d e rﬁrst a closed-economy version of the model where ﬁnal-good producers can only
source from their home country. In terms of the discussion in the introduction, I thus initially focus
2on the control decision and abstract from the locational decision. Henceforth, a subscript V will
be associated with vertical integration and a subscript O with outsourcing.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), contracts are incomplete in the sense that the only con-
tractibles ex-ante (i.e., before the inputs have been produced) are the allocation of residual rights
(i.e., the ownership structure) and a lump-sum transfer between the two parties. In particular,
contracts specifying the purchase of a certain type of intermediate input for a certain price are
not enforceable.4 As a result, H and M can only bargain over the surplus from the relationship
after the inputs have been produced. This ex-post bargaining is modelled as a generalized Nash
bargaining game in which H obtains a fraction β ∈ (0,1) of the ex-post gains from trade. Con-
versely, it is assumed that, ex-ante, H faces a perfectly elastic supply of potential M agents so
that, in equilibrium, the initial transfer will be such that it secures the participation of M in the
relationship at minimum cost to H.
Following the property-rights approach to the theory of the ﬁrm and contrary to the Coase-
Williamson approach, it is assumed that ex-post bargaining takes place both under outsourcing and
under integration. The distribution of surplus, however, is sensitive to the mode of organization
because the outside option of H is naturally higher when it owns the manufacturing plant than
when it does not. To see this, notice that under outsourcing a contractual breach leaves both
agents with a zero payoﬀ because the inputs are useless unless combined together. Instead, when
H integrates the production of m,i te ﬀectively purchases the residual rights of control over this
input. Consequently, if M refuses to trade after the sunk costs have been incurred, H now has the
option of ﬁring M and seizing the amount of m already produced. To ensure positive ex-post gains
from trade, it is assumed, however, that H cannot use the input without M as eﬀectively as it can
with the cooperation of M,s oﬁring M results in a loss of a fraction δ of ﬁnal-good production.
In light of equations (1) and (2), the potential revenue from the sale of y is given by
R(h,m)=λ1−α
µ
h
η
¶αη µ
m
1 − η
¶α(1−η)
.( 3 )
Given the speciﬁcation of the ex-post bargaining, H obtains a fraction βO = β of sale revenue under
outsourcing and a fraction βV = δα + β (1 − δα) >β O under integration. It is straightforward to
show that the optimal ownership structure k∗ is thus the solution to the following program:
3max
k∈{V,O}
πk = R(hk,m k) − ch · hk − cm · mk − f · g (ch,c m) − U
s.t. hk =a r gm a x
h
{βkR(h,mk) − ch · h}
mk =a r gm a x
m {(1 − βk)R(hk,m) − cm · m} (P1)
where R(·) is given in (3) and U is the outside option of the operator M. N o t i c et h a tt h eﬁrst-
best level of investments would be such that πk is maximized. As is clear from the program
(P1), relative to the ﬁrst best, incomplete contracting introduces two constraints that necessarily
lead to underprovision of both h and m. This is due to the classical lock-in eﬀect by which the
threat of contractual breach makes producers perceive only a fraction of the marginal return to
their relationship-speciﬁc investments. The solution to the constrained program (P1) delivers the
following result (see Antràs, 2003 for details):
Proposition 1 There exists a unique threshold b η ∈ (0,1) such that for all η>b η,i n t e g r a t i o n
dominates outsourcing (k∗ = V ), while for all η<b η, outsourcing dominates integration (k∗ = O).
The logic of this result lies at the heart of Grossman and Hart’s (1986) seminal contribution. In
a world of incomplete contracts, ex-ante eﬃciency dictates that residual rights should be controlled
by the party undertaking a relatively more important investment. If production is very intensive
in the m input, the investment made by the ﬁnal-good producer will have a relatively low marginal
product, and it will thus be optimal to assign the residual rights of control to the operator so as
to alleviate the underinvestment in the provision of the m input. Conversely, when production
is intensive in the h input, H will optimally choose to tilt the bargaining power in its favor by
obtaining these residual rights, thus giving rise to vertical integration.
Consider now a two-country version of the model in which ﬁrms are allowed to locate diﬀerent
parts of the production process in either ‘the North’ or ‘the South’. The production process
we described above entails three stages (production of h, m,a n dy), thus giving rise to several
p o t e n t i a ll o c a t i o n a ld e c isions. Let us denote by L the set of possible locational decisions and by
  ∈ L a particular one. For example,   could entail production of h and y in the North and of
m in the South. I will explore several possibilities below. Notice that diﬀerent locational choices
will in general entail diﬀerent values of key parameters. In particular, transport costs and cross-
country diﬀerences in factor prices and in institutions imply that diﬀerent locational choices will
4be associated with diﬀerent values for the parameters ch, cm, f, U, βO,a n dβV ,a sw e l la sf o rt h e
functions R(·) and g(·). Furthermore, as argued in Antràs and Helpman (2004), it is also natural
to allow the ﬁxed cost parameter f to depend on the ownership structure k.
How do these generalizations aﬀect the way ﬁrms organize production? The optimal ownership
structure k∗ and the optimal locational choice  ∗ now solve the following program:
max
k∈{V,O}, ∈L
π 
k = R 
³
h 
k,m  
k
´
− c 
h · h 
k − c 
m · m 
k − f 
k · g 
³
c 
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m
´
− U
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k =a r gm a x h
n
β 
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³
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(P2)
The general program in (P2) is the basis for the three applications of the property-rights ap-
proach discussed in the next three sections.
1 II. A World Equilibrium with Homogenous Firms
In Antràs (2003), I apply the property-rights approach to explain two systematic patterns in the
intraﬁrm component of U.S. trade. In particular, I document that: (i) across industries, the share
of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports is higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting
industry, and (ii) across countries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports is higher,
the higher the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
Let us consider a simple variant version of the model in Antràs (2003). Consumers spend a
constant share of income on diﬀerentiated varieties in two sectors Y and Z. Identical Dixit-Stiglitz
subutility functions in both sectors give rise to a demand function for a particular variety of the
form in (1), with λ being sector-speciﬁc. Preferences are identical in both countries.
Production of diﬀerentiated varieties is as described in the previous section with the additional
assumption that the inputs h and m are nontradable. I assume, however, that agent M can produce
an intermediate input that combines h and m and that is tradable at zero cost. This composite
input is produced according to (2), where the elasticity of output with respect to h is higher in sector
Y than in sector Z, i.e., ηY >η Z.T h eﬁnal-good is produced in the North using this intermediate
input and no additional factors. Notice that these assumptions imply that the locational choice
simply consists in choosing whether h and m are combined in the North or in the South. Hence,
5  ∈ {N,S}. The ownership structure decision is as described above, with the additional simplifying
assumption that β 
k is independent of  , so that contractual frictions are identical in both domestic
and international transactions. It is further assumed that the bargaining parameters β and δ are
identical in both sectors. The ex-ante outside option is normalized to zero, U
  =0 .
On the cost structure, it is assumed that h is capital-intensive relative to m.B e c a u s eh needs to
be produced in the same location where m is produced, this can be interpreted as H contributing
to the physical capital investments of M,e . g . ,ﬁnancing the construction of a production facility.5
For simplicity, I assume extreme factor intensity so that c 
h = r  and c 
m = w ,w h e r er  and w 
denote the rental and wage rates in country  .I ti sa l s oc o n v e n i e n tt oa s s u m et h a tﬁxed costs have
the same factor intensity as variable costs (i.e., g 
j
¡
r ,w ¢
=
¡
r ¢ηj ¡
w ¢1−ηj for j = Y,Z)a n dt h a t
f 
k is independent of ownership structure and location.
It is straightforward to show that under these assumptions the ownership structure and loca-
tional decisions in (P2) can be analyzed separately. Furthermore, the optimal ownership structure
in sector j ∈ {Y,Z} solves (P1), while the optimal location decision solves min 
n¡
r ¢ηj ¡
w ¢1−ηj
o
.
This implies that Proposition 1 applies and all producers in sector j will engage in vertical integra-
tion if ηj > b η, and in outsourcing if ηj < b η. It thus follows that assuming ηY > b η>η Z, all Northern
imports in sector Y will be transacted within ﬁrm boundaries, while all Northern imports in sector
Z will be transacted at arm’s length. This result provides a rationale for the positive correlation
between capital intensity and intraﬁrm trade mentioned at the beginning of this section.
In Antràs (2003) I solve for the full general equilibrium of the model in which free entry drives
proﬁts down to zero, factor markets clear in both countries, and world income equals world spending.
If the South is capital-scarce relative to the North but relative factor endowment diﬀerences are not
too large, then international trade will bring about factor price equalization, in which case factor
market clearing in the South will require that the South produces a disproportionate share of the
world output in the labor-intensive sector Z. Furthermore, the lower is the capital-labor ratio in
the South, the lower will be the share of sector-Y imports in total Northern imports from the
South. Coupling this prediction with the fact that only in sector Y are imports transacted within
ﬁrm boundaries immediately delivers a positive correlation between the capital-labor ratio in the
South and the share of intraﬁrm imports in total Northern imports. This is the second systematic
pattern mentioned above. More details on the derivations of these results can be found in Antràs
(2003), where a multi-country version of the model is developed and where the correlations that
6motivate the theoretical model are shown to be robust to the inclusion of several industry and
country characteristics.
III. A World Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Firms
An implication of the previous model with homogenous ﬁrms is that an industry’s share of intraﬁrm
trade in total trade should be either 100 percent or zero. In Antràs (2003), I instead unveil a smooth
positive relationship between the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U.S. imports and both capital
intensity and R&D intensity. To reconcile theory and evidence I appeal to a mismatch between
what an industry is to the statistician relative to what it is to the representative consumer. A much
more satisfactory approach is to appropriately model intraindustry heterogeneity and to identify
ﬁrm-level characteristics that might aﬀect the internal organization of ﬁrms. This is the approach
in Antràs and Helpman (2004), where we incorporate intraindustry heterogeneity of the Melitz
(2003) type in a property-rights model of the multinational ﬁrm. In the remainder of this section
I describe a simpliﬁed version of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model.
Consumers in both countries demand the output of one homogenous-good sector and J diﬀerentiated-
good sectors. Preferences are quasilinear in the homogenous good and feature a constant elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerentiated varieties within a sector and also between varieties in diﬀer-
ent sectors (the latter elasticity is assumed higher). This preference structure delivers a demand
function for a particular variety in industry j that is analogous to (1), where λ is sector speciﬁc
and is a function of the aggregate consumption in the sector.
Firm behavior is a variant of the general program (P2). It is again assumed that the ﬁnal
good y is always produced in the North. The intermediate inputs h and m are now tradable,
but it is assumed that h (which we associate with headquarters services) is only produced in the
North. The location decision thus reduces to the choice of where to produce m (which we think of
as manufactured components). Hence, again   ∈ {N,S}, but note that N and S have a diﬀerent
interpretation from that above. To simplify matters, we again abstract from institutional diﬀerences
across countries and sectors and assume that the bargaining weights β 
k are independent of   and
j.6 The ex-ante outside option is again normalized to zero, U
  =0 .
Producers in each country face a perfectly elastic supply of the unique factor of production,
labor. These wage rates are ﬁxed and we assume that wN >w S.T h e ﬁnal good is produced
7according to e y = θy,w h e r ey is given in (2) and the productivity parameter θ is ﬁrm speciﬁc
and drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape z, i.e., G(θ)=1− (b/θ)
z for θ ≥ b>0.7 The
elasticity of output with respect to h is common to all ﬁrms within a sector, but varies across
sectors. Production of intermediate inputs requires unit of labor per unit of output in the country
where they are produced. The international shipment of components is costly and τ units of m
need to be shipped from the South for one unit to arrive to the North. Provided that this transport
cost is low enough, our assumptions imply that cN
h = cN
m = wN >τw S = cS
m.
There are also diﬀerent types of ﬁxed costs of production, which are all deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
Northern labor (i.e., gN (·)=gS (·)=wN). First, H needs to incur a ﬁxed cost fE of entry, upon
which the productivity parameter θ is revealed to him or her. If H decides to remain in the market,
additional ﬁxed organizational costs need to be incurred. As discussed in Antràs and Helpman
(2004), these ﬁxed organizational costs are likely to vary depending on whether m is sourced in
the North or in the South, and on whether it is insourced or outsourced. In particular, a natural
ranking of these ﬁxed costs is
fS
V >f S
O >f N
V >f N
O .
In words, ﬁxed organizational costs are higher when M is located in the South regardless of own-
ership structure, and given the location of M,t h eﬁxed organizational costs are higher when M is
i n t e g r a t e dt h a nw h e ni ti sn o t .
With this setup, the choice of an organizational form faces two types of tensions. In terms of
the location decision, the South entails relatively lower variable costs, but relatively higher ﬁxed
costs. As in the work of Melitz (2003), it is clear that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity parameter
θ will crucially aﬀect the ﬁrm’s participation in international trade. In terms of the integration
decision, integration improves eﬃciency of variable production when the intensity of headquarter
services is high (see Proposition 1 above), but involves higher ﬁxed costs. This integration decision
will thus crucially depend on both η and θ.
In Antràs and Helpman (2004), we show that equilibria featuring multiple organizational forms
within an industry can easily be constructed. In particular, in our benchmark headquarter-intensive
sector, the least productive ﬁrms exit the market upon observing their productivity, and four non-
empty (and connected) subsets of the remaining ﬁrms choose each of the four possible organizational
forms. The most productive ﬁrms in the North engage in foreign insourcing (or FDI in the South),
8t h en e x tm o s tp r o d u c t i v eﬁrms undertake foreign outsourcing, the next subset insource domestically,
and the least productive ﬁrms among the surviving ones outsource domestically.
We also use the model to study the determinants of the relative prevalence of these diﬀerent
organizational forms. The predictions we obtain move well beyond those derived in Antràs (2003)
and open the door for more careful empirical studies of the characteristics of the international
organization of production. In particular, the model predicts that, in a cross-section of industries,
the share of intraﬁrm imports of components in total imports of components should be higher in
industries with higher headquarter intensity (higher η), higher productivity dispersion (lower z),
and higher transport costs (higher τ). Furthermore, the same applies for a comparison between do-
mestic insourcing and domestic outsourcing. We also ﬁnd that increasing wage diﬀerences between
the North and the South or falling international trade costs increase the amount of international
sourcing, but also increase the share of foreign outsourcing in total foreign sourcing and the share
of domestic outsourcing in total domestic sourcing. We argue that these predictions are consistent
with broad patterns in the data.
IV. Diﬀerences in Contract Enforceability and Product Cycles
A maintained assumption in the previous sections was that the degree of enforceability of contracts
was identical in both countries, in the sense that contracts featured the same level of incompleteness
independently of where the agents involved in the transaction reside. In Antràs (2005), I explore
the more plausible scenario in which contracts governing international transactions are relatively
less enforceable than contracts governing domestic transactions.8
The structure of the model is very similar to that in section III. In particular, h and y are always
produced in the North, so the location decision consists on where to source m, while the ownership
decision consists on whether to integrate M or not. Labor is the unique factor of production.
The model is simpler in that all ﬁrms within an industry are identical (θ =1for all ﬁrms), ﬁxed
costs are independent of location and ownership structure, and transport costs are zero. The main
innovation in the modeling of ﬁrm behavior is that when   = N, that is when domestic sourcing
is chosen, contracts specifying the purchase of a particular intermediate input for a given price are
fully enforceable. This is shown to be identical to solving the problem in (P2), but with the two
constraints being operative only when   = S. To avoid technical complications, it is also assumed
9that βS
V ≤ 3/4 (this assumption is relaxed in the Appendix of the original paper). Given this setup,
in Antràs (2005) I prove formally that:
Proposition 2 I ft h er e l a t i v ew a g ewN/wS is suﬃciently high, there exist two thresholds η and η
with η ≥ η such that: (i) if η>η, it is optimal to produce input m in the North; (ii) if η>η>η ,
it is optimal to assign the production of m to an integrated supplier in the South, and (iii) if η<η ,
it is optimal to assign the production of m to a nonintegrated supplier in the South.
To understand this result, notice that in choosing between domestic and foreign sourcing, the
Northern manager H faces a trade-oﬀ between the lower costs of Southern components and the
higher incomplete-contracting distortions associated with it. When headquarter intensity η is high,
sourcing in the South is very unattractive because it bears the full cost of incomplete contract-
ing (which aﬀects both the h and m inputs) with little beneﬁt from the lower wage in the South
(which only aﬀects the m input). On the other hand, when components have a suﬃciently large
marginal product, the lower wage in the South has a suﬃciently large eﬀect on proﬁts to oﬀset
the incomplete-contracting distortions. Because transactions in the North are governed by com-
plete contracts, ownership structure in Northern sourcing is both indeterminate and irrelevant.
In contrast, when Southern sourcing is chosen (η<η), the assignment of residual rights is much
more interesting and conforms to the results in the previous sections. In particular, there exists a
threshold headquarter intensity over (under) which Southern insourcing dominates (is dominated
by) Southern outsourcing.
In Antràs (2005), I use these results to develop a new version of Vernon’s (1966) product cycle
hypothesis. I model the continuous standardization of goods along their life cycle as a gradual fall
in η. Intuitively, relative to product development, marketing, and other services provided by the
headquarters H, the mere assembly of a product becomes a more signiﬁcant input in production as
the good matures and its production technique becomes standardized. A corollary of Proposition 2
is then that the model features a three-stage product cycle. Because of contractual frictions, goods
are initially manufactured in the same country where product development takes place. When
the good becomes suﬃciently standardized, the manufacturing stage of production shifts to a low-
wage foreign location, but this transfer occurs ﬁrst within ﬁrm boundaries, and only at a later
stage to independent foreign ﬁrms. In the paper, I discuss several cross-sectional and time-series
implications of the model and relate them to the empirical literature on the product cycle.
10In Antràs (2005), I also develop a simple general-equilibrium extension of the model, in which
the relative wage wN/wS is endogenously pinned down. A salient feature of the analysis is that as
long as contracts governing international transactions are incomplete, the equilibrium wage in the
North necessarily exceeds that in the South.9
V. Conclusions
The models developed above have generated a rich set of predictions regarding the way ﬁrms
organize production across borders. They should thus provide some guidance for future empirical
studies on this important topic. A limitation of the above analysis has been the focus on only
two decisions (location and control) of multinational ﬁrms. Future eﬀorts should be directed at
incorporating additional dimensions of organizational economics into the study of the international
organization of production.
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Notes
1Richard E. Caves (1996, p. 1) deﬁnes a multinational ﬁrm as “an enterprise that controls and manages
production establishments — plants — located in at least two countries.”
2This previous literature builds on the seminal work of Elhanan Helpman (1984) and James R. Markusen
(1984).
3The internalization decision of multinational ﬁrms has also been studied, among others, by Wilfred J.
Ethier (1986), Ethier and Markusen (1996), John E. McLaren (2000), and Gene M. Grossman and Help-
man (2002, 2004). These authors focus on modeling the costs of arm’s-length transacting stemming from
informational asymmetries, knowledge dissipation, contractual frictions, and costly search. In none of these
approaches is the internalization decision related to the allocation of some residual rights of control. An
important caveat of these previous approaches is that they shed little light on the costs of internalization.
4This would naturally be the case if agents could choose the quality of inputs but a court of law could
not verify it (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002, and Antràs, 2003, for more details).
5In Antràs (2003), I present evidence suggesting that cost-sharing in physical capital investments is quite
common.
6In Antràs and Helpman (2004), we consider the case in which δ
N >δ
S and thus β
N
V >β
S
V . We interpret
this assumption as reﬂecting better legal protection in the North.
7The parameter z is assumed large enough to ensure a ﬁnite variance of the size distribution of ﬁrms.
8In Antràs and Helpman (2004) we consider institutional diﬀerences across countries that aﬀect the
ex-post division of surplus for a given level of contractual incompleteness (see footnote 6 above).
9Another appealing characteristic of the general-equilibrium analysis is that the cross-sectional picture
that emerges from the model is very similar to that in the classical Ricardian model with a continuum of goods
of Rudiger Dornbusch et al. (1977), with the novelty that comparative advantage arises endogenously from a
combination of the Northern productivity advantage in product development, the continuous standardization
of goods, and the incompleteness of contracts.
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